The AEC "Big Bang" Side Show:

Denying open and transparent Scrutiny of the ballot for a side show of pressing the Button

It will very interesting to see if the below the line vote will make any difference to the projected outcome in WA. For one there is over 360 votes attributed to One Nation’s Robert Farmer (Most of these will be reverse donkey votes.)

When the AEC get around to publishing the BTL preference data files, which copies have been denied to scrutineers as it takes the Big bang away from the AEC pressing of the button show and allows room for any last minute twigging of the votes as no one knows what is contained in the data file, leaving it open to possible corruption. Scrutineers prevented from being able to verify the contents of the data-file during the count.

The refusal of the AEC to subject the count to a full open and transparent scrutiny undermines confidence in the overall process.

The preference data-files are eventually published, months after the election has been declared and the crowd and public attention has dissipated. This adds a whole new meaning to “secret ballot” when scrutineers are denied access to copies of crucial computer data-files that are used to determine the results of the election just so the AEC can have maintain an element of surprise and leave open a window for preference data to be tweeked

Had these data-files been published progressively during the count then you would have been able to include them in your Calculator's analysis
It would also be possible to highlight the impact in the flaws in the way in which the Senate vote is counted

Analysis of the WA Sent votes based on registered group voting tickets using three different system to count the vote

Model A

If you count the vote using AEC Senate rules with a non-weighted (Surplus Transfer calculated by dividing Surplus value by number of ballot papers) segmented distribution (distributing votes in segments based on their value, stopping mid stream of a exclusion distribution, skipping candidates remaining in the count and transferring the remaining votes at a higher value then would be the case if they were transferred as a single transaction)
 

PUP and ALP take the last two spots in WA

Model B

If you use the Western Australian Weighted (Surplus Transfer Value based on the value of the vote spot the number of ballot papers) with segmented distribution of excluded candidates votes (as described above)

PUP and Greens in the last two spots

Model C
“The wright System”

If you weight it (Surplus value based on the value of the vote) and apply a reiterative count removing the segmented distribution by resetting and restarting the count on each exclusion only distributing surpluses on each exclusion, one single transaction per candidate.

PUP and ALP win the last two seats.

Model C (Wright System) being the preferred method as it reflects the voters intentions where first preferences from excluded candidates are distributed as if the excluded candidates had not stood

The other alternative model is Meek which in 99.98% of the time produces the same result as the Wright System

Posted by: democracyATwork | September 25, 2013 at 07:28 PM

Request to AEC: Maintaining an open and transparent electoral process

Dear Australian Electoral Commission,

 I request that the Electoral Commission as part of its obligations
and commitment to maintaining an open and transparent electoral
process publish progressively during the data-entry process copies
of the electronic data entry preference data files used to tabulate
the election results.

This information should be readily available and certified copies
of the data files MUST be published prior to the declaration of the
polls.

There is no legislative or overriding reason why this information
is not published on line as is the case with other electoral
results. An electronic record of the data is the same as any other
document or record.

It is fundamental that our electoral system is open and transparent
and subject to full independent scrutiny

By refusing to make this information available for scrutiny
undermines public confidence and brings the Electoral Commission
and the election itself into disrepute

WA Senate outcome a close contest still undecided. Scrutineers denied access to crucial data files.

WA Senate still looks like being a close contest but at present the likelihood is 3 Liberal 1 ALP 1 Sports and 1 Green

In theory there is a plausible situation where Sport Party can be out polled early in the count with two close junction point contests between Sports Party and Rise Up Australia and No Carbon Tax Climate Skeptics. The unknown factor is the below-the-line votes and votes for One Nation candidate Robert Farmer who has 330 votes. One Nation failed to register a second group candidate and as such was forced into the un-grouped column and unable to register a group ticket.

If sufficient number of votes flow to either RUA or TCS and Sports Party excluded early in the count then WANG, Zhenya WANG, Palmer United and Louise Pratt can be elected to the last two seats

This is a seat where access to the Below-the-line preference data file is crucial. The Australian electoral commission has refused requests from scrutineers and candidates to provide progressive copies of the data files. This has marred the conduct of the election and left the commission open to allegations of undermining confidence in the Australian Electoral Commission and  the election procedures which are no longer open or transparent.

It is also a seat where the distortions in the counting of the Senate vote could also determine the outcome. The calculation of the surplus transfer value and the method of segmentation and distribution of votes from excluded candidates.

Votes from excluded candidates should be redistributed as if the excluded candidates had not stood.

This is not the case under Australian Senate count rules.

The method of calculating the Surplus transfer value based on the number of ballot papers as opposed to the value of the vote can add the equivalent of an an extra 10,000 votes to a candidates total.

Likewise the method of segmentation distribution of excluded candidates can also determine the outcome then if there is a complete single transfer per candidate.

In 2007 these distortions in the count decided the outcome of the Queensland Senate Count (Segmentation) and came close to defeating ALP Senate Candidate David Feeney in Victoria (Surplus Transfer Value)

With scrutineers denied access to copies of the below-the-line preference data. it is impossible to effectively and properly scrutinise the integrity of the count. Scrutineers from the Greens, the ALP, Sports Party and Palmer United have requested access to this data.

There is no legal situation preventing the Commission from releasing this information progressively as the data is data-entered and reporting this on its web site as it does with other elections results and election data.

The Commission claims that it is not required to produce copies of this information in electronic format. Although to produce this information in printed form would be time consuming and highly inefficient. Electronic data files are recognised under law to be the equivalent to documents in hard copy.

Copy of the AEC response to scrutineers requests can be found here

No doubts the process of the election count and the refusal of the commission to subject the count to a full and open transparent scrutiny will be part of the review of the conduct of the Australian Senate ballot and a possible legal challenge from either of the effected parties.

Scrutiny Denied: AEC reply to request for copies of BTL Preference data-files

UPDATED. See below  

Published in this article is the Australian Electoral Commission's reply to written request for Scrutineers to be provided copies of the Below-the-line preference data-files.

There is nothing in the legislation that prevents this information being made available to scrutineers . It is no different then the publication of the progressive results for the House of representatives.

Without access to this information it is impossible to independently verify the integrity of the elections results.

It is akin to shopping at a supermarket and watching good get scanned, without a receipt and a running balance you have no idea of the costs charged are correct 

The Australian Electoral Commission's failure to ensure that the electronic count is open and transparent brings the conduct of the Senate election into disrepute.

Other parties and States have also requested progressive access to copies of the below-the-line preference data files and been refused.

What does the Commission have to hide that it refuses to publish this crucial information?  

By not publishing this data in a timely fashion and subjecting it to proper independent scrutiny in a timely fashion leaves the Commission open to allegations that the information recorded on the file may have been changed or altered.


UPDATED.  We have sent teh following letter to Mr Jeff Pope APM Australian Electoral Commission. Our request was once again was denied and an application for review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is pending

Copy of text dated 23-September-2013

Jeff Pope APM

Australian Electoral Commission and State Manager for Victoria

State Executive

Victorian State Office

Further to your correspondence dated 18 September 2013

Re: Request for copies of the below the line Data-entry records recording the details and preferences in electronic format

The information requested in my previous correspondence falls within the definition of Section 273A(6) (a) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act and the definition of record as outlined in the Acts interpretation Act

COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL ACT 1918 - SECT 273A

Computerised scrutiny of votes in Senate election

...

Rights of scrutineers

             (6)  For proceedings under subsections (4) and (5) of this section, the requirements of paragraph 265(1)(c) are met if the scrutineers have access to:

                     (a)  a record of the preferences on the ballot papers that have been received by the Australian Electoral Officer and whose details have been stored in the computer (including informal ballot papers, and formal ballot papers that are not sequentially numbered); and

                     (b)  a record of the ballot papers that are notionally transferred, or exhausted, at each count; and

                     (c)  a record of the progress of the count of the votes, at each count.

  

ACTS INTERPRETATION ACT 1901

Definitions

…

"document" means any record of information, and includes:

                     (a)  anything on which there is writing;
…

"record" includes information stored or recorded by means of a computer.

The information requested is the record (s) of the preferences on the ballot papers that have been received by the Australian Electoral Officer and whose details have been stored in the computer.

The Australian Electoral Commission has an obligation to provide this information to scrutineers pursuant to Section 273A(6) of the Act as requested

This information is required in order that Scrutineers can verify the integrity and correctness of information stored in the computer that is used to tabulate and determine the results of the election.  The information requested should be provided in the most cost effective and efficient means possible. The information requested is readily available in electronic format.

I again request that the information sought be provided without delay and that regular updates be provided on a daily basis with certified copies of the information provided prior to the declaration of the poll

Should you require further information I can be contacted via return email or telephone 0403378111

Yours faithfully

Anthony van der Craats

Scrutineer

Australian labor Party

PO Box 254 Carlton South Victoria 3053

Email: Melbcity@gmail.com

 

Australian Electoral Commission to deny open transaparent scrutiny of the Australian Senate election computer count

The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) has indicated that it will deny scrutineers the right to properly scrutinise the conduct or the Senate election by not providing copies of the below-the-line preference data-files.

Information of preferences stored on the AEC's computer database is used to electronically count the results of the election.

Providing copies of the preference data-file as the data-entry progresses is the only way to ensure that the results of the data match the information transcribed from the ballot papers.

Whilst scrutineers are allowed to observe the data-entry process they are denied a means of ensuring the integrity of the data stored on the computer.

By way of analogy: You monitor the scanning of goods bought at a supermarket but the supermarket refused to provide a copy of receipt docket that allows you to verify your purchases

There is no justification or reason for the Australian Electoral Commission to deny access to this information. This information is readily available. Copies of the preference data-files should be provided so that scrutineers can  monitor the progress of the count and the integrity of the election results. Without access to copies of the data-files, progressively as the vote is being recorded, it is impossible for scrutineers to monitor or independently verify the overall results of the election..

The refusal of the Australian Electoral Commission in 2010 to provide scrutineers copies of the Senate Below-The-Line preference data-file undermined the confidence and integrity of the conduct of the election and was the subject of submissions made to the Federal Parliament Joint Select Committee on Electoral Matters. (JSCEM) In all other respects the conduct of the scrutiny of the ballot was exemplary  

Copies of the Senate preference data-files were made available after the period in which the election could be challenge.

Writs Returned - Mission accomplished

All Senate positions have been declared and the Writs returned

The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) announced today that it had returned the writs for the 2010 House of Representatives elections, and for the Senate elections in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory to Her Excellency, Ms Quentin Bryce, Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Writs for Senate elections in all states have been returned to the State Governors.

Close of Business, Friday September 17, Writs returned and the AEC still has not published the Below-the-Line (BTL) preference data for the Victorian Senate.

http://vtr.aec.gov.au/External/SenateStateBtlDownload-15508-VIC.zip

All other states have been published.

UPDATE: (Sept 19) THE AEC HAS PULLED THE PUBLICATION OF THE BELOW-THE-LINE PREFERENCE DATA. THE LINKS BELOW PREVISOULY WORKED NOW THEY DON'T (We have published copies of the data-files here) 

Update: (Sept 20)  Files are back up and can be accessed via the main menu page.  Victoria's BTL data still missing http://vtr.aec.gov.au/SenateDownloadsMenu-15508-csv.htm

 Loctation of data-files available
http://vtr.aec.gov.au/External/SenateStateBtlDownload-15508-NSW.zip
http://vtr.aec.gov.au/External/SenateStateBtlDownload-15508-OLD.zip
http://vtr.aec.gov.au/External/SenateStateBtlDownload-15508-SA.zip
http://vtr.aec.gov.au/External/SenateStateBtlDownload-15508-WA.zip
http://vtr.aec.gov.au/External/SenateStateBtlDownload-15508-TAS.zip
http://vtr.aec.gov.au/External/SenateStateBtlDownload-15508-ACT.zip
http://vtr.aec.gov.au/External/SenateStateBtlDownload-15508-NT.zip 



The AEC’s refusal to provide scrutineers access to copies of the progressive BTL preference data files, reconciliation data files and the AEC Chief Legal Officer's, Paul Pirani, response to scrutineers request that copies of the BTL data would require payment of $30 and a FOI application has marred what has otherwise been an exemplary counting process.

The double entry-data verification, on-site and off-site backup twice daily, retention of the primary and secondary preference data and manual checking of reported forced entry and inconsistent data-entry records go a long way towards addressing concerns that were highlighted in the 2006 Victorian State election.

Unlike in Victoria votes did not go missing between count A and count B and crucial data files were not deleted, as was the case in 2006 Western Metro count.

Of course this begs the question "Why has Victoria spent Millions of dollars duplicating software development and process when they could have just utilised the professional services provided by the AEC?"


Millions of dollars wasted by the State government that could have been better spent on health, education, roads or other services.

Seams no one is monitoring the expenditure and waste in supporting multiple electoral authorities. Double counting, Numerous junkets undertaken by the administration and the pollys with no accountability. "You scratch my back I’ll scratch yours, MUMS the word"

It is time for a re-think and the establishment of a single independent electoral authority and time to put an end to the waste and duplication.

Scrutiny denied

The AEC has responded to scrutineers request for copies of the below the line preference data files to be made available for proper scrutiny.

scru·tiny

 /ˈskrutni/ Show Spelled[skroot-new] Show IPA

–noun, plural -nis.

1. a searching examination or investigation; minute inquiry.
2. surveillance; close and continuous watching or guarding
3. a close and searching look.

Mr Paul Pirani, AEC legal Officer's, response (extract below) is a clear indication that the AEC is unwilling and incapable of self management in order to maintain an open and transparent electoral process.  Without access to the preference data-files it is impossible to properly scrutinise the conduct and counting of the election results.

Mr Pirani in his telephone conversation on Friday  falsely stated that to do so would nessiate the delay and stopping of the data-entry process.  This is not the case.  According to information provided by AEC staff, Ballot paper preferences are data-entered on stand alone computer terminals located in the counting room and the information and data is then copied on to a numbered USB drive and transferred to a central database terminal which is networked and connected to the Internet.   Networked computer terminals are set up that provide limited "Read Only" access to each ballot paper data record. The information that is available is limited by the method of access one record at a time. Copies of the data files can readily be produced and the integrity of the count is not compromised, nor is the secrecy of the ballot, as there is no means of identifying the voter.

Without copies of the data-files being progressively made available there is no means of monitoring the quality and integrity of the data stored or any means of ensuring that the information has not been tampered with over night. In expressing these concerns we are not implying that the AEC staff have in any way acted illegally, to the contrary, in all other aspects the conduct of the count of the election is exemplary, but it has been marred by the AEC's refusal to not subject the full details of the count to proper scrutiny.

There is no legal limitation that prevents access to the data files requested, in spite Mr Pirani's assertions that there is an "implied limitation".  This information was freely provided after the 2007 Federal Election (be it some three months after the declaration of the the poll). Mr Pirani stated that the information would only be made available on application under the provisions of the freedom from information Act and payment of $30 fee. (Something we consider to be an abuse of process given that this information should be readily and freely available)

It would have taken the AEC less then 3 minutes to make a copy of the requested data files, much less then it would have taken for Mr Pirani to espouse and pen the reply below.



 

I refer to your letter that was faxed to me after the close of business on 10 September 2010 and your email below.

I am instructed by the Australian Electoral Officer for Victoria (AEO) that AEC staff are still engaged in entering details from the Senate ballot papers into the AEC computer system and are yet to finalise the verification of that data. It is only after the conclusion of this process that the AEO will proceed with the running of the computer program to undertake the Senate count in accordance with the requirements of subsection 273A(5) of the Electoral Act.

The legal rights of a scrutineer to access information during the conduct of central Senate scrutiny (which is the process that is taking place now at the premises in Melbourne) are set out in subsection 273A(6) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Electoral Act). This subsection provides that:

(6) For proceedings under subsections (4) and (5) of this section, the requirements of paragraph 265(1)(c) are met if the scrutineers have access to:
(a) a record of the preferences on the ballot papers that have been received by the Australian Electoral Officer and whose details have been stored in the computer (including informal ballot papers, and formal ballot papers that are not sequentially numbered); and
(b) a record of the ballot papers that are notionally transferred, or exhausted, at each count; and
(c) a record of the progress of the count of the votes, at each count.

Implicit in the above is that the Parliament has determined that the duties of a scrutineer can be properly performed at this stage of the scrutiny process by a person only having access to the above information. Accordingly, there is no right for a scrutineer to demand access to all or any information that may be in the possession of the AEC as you appear to imply in your email and letter.

The rights contained in subsection 273A(6) of the Electoral Act are exhaustive as to what information a scrutineer is legally able to access and the timing of that access. When this is combined with the present fact that not all of the Senate ballot paper “details have been stored in the computer” at this time, this raises doubts as to a scrutineer’s legal right to access any of the data sets specified in your email and letter at this time. In relation to the timing of access, I am instructed that the AEO has not agreed to provide you with access to any data stored in the AEC computer until after the count has taken place.

Further, I note that there is no legal right or obligation placed on the AEC to provide any scrutineer with access to the information you are seeking in an electronic format. The AEC is only required to provide a scrutineer with access to “a record” of the three data sets specified in subsection 273A(6) of the Electoral Act.

Accordingly, I seek your specific response to exactly how each of the data sets to which you are claiming to require access to as a scrutineer falls within the scope of subsection 273A(6) of the Electoral Act.

While I am aware that following the 2007 general election, the AEC agreed to provide you with access to a CD Rom that included an electronic version of the verified “record of the preferences” stored in the computer and the details of each count, this was done as a private citizen with interest in electoral matters. I am currently instructed that the AEC is prepared to repeat this action following the return of the writs for the 2010 general election.


Yours sincerely



Paul Pirani
Chief Legal Officer
Legal and Compliance Branch
Australian Electoral Commission

T: (02) 6271 4474 F: (02) 6271 4457

UNCLASSIFIED